We present a new flow-type convex program describing equilibrium solutions to linear Arrow-Debreu markets. Whereas convex formulations were previously known ([Nenakov and Primak 1983; Jain 2007; Cornet 1989] ), our program exhibits several new features. It provides a simple necessary and sufficient condition and a concise proof of the existence and rationality of equilibria, settling an open question raised by Vazirani [2012]. As a consequence, we also obtain a simple new proof of the result in Mertens [2003] that the equilibrium prices form a convex polyhedral set. special case, the linear Fisher model, that was formulated by Fisher in 1891, who also studied the computability of equilibrium via a hydraulic machine no less! (See Brainard and Scarf [2000] for a fascinating account.) In this model, the agents are separated into two types, buyers and sellers; buyers arrive to the market with a certain amount of money that they wish to spend on goods offered by the sellers. This model turned out to be substantially easier from a computational perspective than the linear Arrow-Debreu model. A convex programming formulation was given by Eisenberg and Gale [1959]. The problem of equilibrium computation was introduced to the theoretical computer science community by Devanur et al. [2008], who presented a polynomial time combinatorial primal-dual algorithm. This initiated an intensive line of research, most notable among which is a strongly polynomial time algorithm by Orlin [2010]; for a survey, see Nisan et al. [2007, Chapter 5] or Vazirani [2012]. Also, Shmyrev [2009] presented a new type of convex program (which was discovered independently by Birnbaum et al. [2011] ) capturing the equilibria.
INTRODUCTION
The exchange market model is a classical model of a market along with a notion of equilibrium, introduced by Walras in [1874] . In this model, agents arrive at the market with an initial endowment of divisible goods and a utility function for consuming goods. A market equilibrium assigns prices to the goods such that, when every agent uses the revenue from selling one's initial endowment for purchasing a bundle of goods that maximizes one's utility, the market clears, that is, the total demand for every good is equal to its supply. The celebrated theorem by Arrow and Debreu [1954] proves the existence of a market equilibrium under mild necessary conditions on the utility functions; therefore, it is commonly known as the Arrow-Debreu market model. Since then, understanding equilibrium behavior and computing equilibrium prices has been extensively studied in mathematical economics and, more recently, in theoretical computer science.
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In this article, we present a rational convex program for the linear Arrow-Debreu model, which also guarantees the existence of an equilibrium, thus settling the open questions of Vazirani [2012] . Our convex program draws from the convex programs in Eisenberg and Gale [1959], Shmyrev [2009] and Birnbaum et al. [2011] ; more precisely, it is a combination of the convex program of Shmyrev [2009] and Birnbaum et al. [2011] and a dual program described in Devanur [2009] . The objective function has terms from both convex programs and there are two sets of constraints: one describing a circulation polyhedron, as in Shmyrev [2009] and Birnbaum et al. [2011] , and another from the dual program. In fact, in Section 4, we explain how we obtained the formulation from these two programs for linear Fisher markets. The main technical contribution is to show the existence of an equilibrium based on the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for this convex program. Our program is feasible if and only if the necessary and sufficient conditions of Gale [1976] on the existence of equilibria hold. The existence of a rational optimal solution for rational input follows by showing that there exists an optimal solution that is an extreme point of the feasible region. Now, we present a formal description of the model and our convex program. We are given set A of n agents, and assume that there is a one-to-one mapping between agents and goods, every agent i ∈ A arrives with one divisible unit of good of type i. This is without loss of generality: the general case with an arbitrary set of goods and arbitrary initial endowments can be easily reduced to this setting; see Section 3. The utility of agent i for the good of agent j is u ij ≥ 0. The directed graph (A, E) contains an arc ij for every pair with u ij > 0; it may also contain loops expressing that some agents are interested in their own goods. We make the standard assumption that, for each agent i ∈ A, E contains at least one incoming and one outgoing arc incident to i.
By a market equilibrium, we mean a set of prices p : A → R + and allocations x : E → R + satisfying the following conditions.
-Market clearing: Demand equals supply.
-i∈A x ij = 1, for every j ∈ A, that is, every good is fully sold.
-p i = j∈A x ij p j for every i ∈ A, that is, the money spent by agent i equals i's income p i . -Optimal bundle: Every agent is allocated a utility maximizing bundle subject to its budget constraint. That reduces to -For every i ∈ A, if x ij > 0, then u ij / p j is the maximal value over j ∈ A.
It is easy to see that the following condition is necessary for the existence of an equilibrium:
For every strongly connected component S ⊆ E of the digraph (A, E), if |S| = 1, then there is a loop incident to the node in S.
Assume that {k} is a singleton strongly connected component without a loop. Let T denote the set of nodes different from k that can be reached on a directed path in E from k. In an equilibrium allocation, the agents in T ∪ {k} spend all their money on the goods of the agents in T ; this implies that p k = 0, contrary to our assumption.
We formulate the following convex program, with variables p i representing the prices, the β i s the inverse best bang-per-bucks, and y ij the money paid by agent i to agent j.
Consider an instance of the linear Arrow-Debreu market given by the graph (A, E) and the utilities u : E → R + . The convex program (CP) is feasible if and only if ( ) holds, and, in this case, the optimum value is 0, and the prices p i in an optimal solution give a market equilibrium with allocations x ij = y ij / p j . Further, if all utilities are rational numbers, then there exists a market equilibrium with all prices and allocations also rational, of bitsize polynomially bounded in the input size.
Here, the bitsize of the rational number p/q is defined as log 2 p + log 2 q . The rational optimum property follows by observing that there exists an optimal extremal point solution. The following results easily follow from this theorem: COROLLARY 1.2. The following hold for linear Arrow-Debreu markets.
(1) For every agent, the utility is the same at every equilibrium.
(2) The vectors (y, p) at equilibrium form a convex set. In particular, the set of price vectors at equilibrium is convex.
Property (i) was already proved by Gale [1976] and also follows from Cornet [1989] . While the convexity of equilibrium prices was proved by Mertens [2003] and by Florig [2004] , both these proofs are quite involved, whereas it is a straightforward consequence of Theorem 1.1. We are not aware of previous proofs on the convexity of y. In contrast, Cornet [1989] proved that (x, log p) is convex at equilibria; here, x ij = y ij / p j is the amount of good j allocated to agent i.
The Lagrangian dual of (CP) is similar to Cornet's program [1989] (see (CP-C) in Section 3), but is different from it. Also, analyzing the optimal Lagrange multipliers for (CP), we can derive the feasibility convex program of Nenakov and Primak [1983] and Jain [2007] ; these correspondences will be explained in Section 3. Our program exhibits some new and advantageous features as compared to Cornet's: -The program (CP) provides the necessary and sufficient condition of the existence of equilibria. In contrast, Cornet's program provides only a stronger sufficient condition given by Gale [1957] . -The program (CP) is feasible if and only if there exists an equilibrium. In contrast, Cornet's program can be feasible also if there exists no equilibrium; in this case, the objective is unbounded. -The program (CP) demonstrates the existence of a rational equilibrium in a very simple way. Rationality can also be derived for the previous programs, but it requires further nontrivial arguments. -All constraints in (CP) are linear.
-Our program establishes links to known convex programs for the Fisher model.
We think that the discovery of this convex program will pave the way for more efficient (and, in particular, strongly polynomial-time) algorithms for this model.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 is dedicated to the proof of Theorem 1.1. This is based on the KKT conditions; however, the argument is not straightforward, in contrast to similar arguments for the convex programs of Eisenberg and Gale [1959] , Shmyrev [2009] , and Birnbaum et al. [2011] . Section 3 shows the equivalence of our existence condition ( ) to previous results by Gale [1957, 1976] , exhibits the previous convex programs [Cornet 1989; Nenakov and Primak 1983; Jain 2007] , and explains the correspondence between our formulation (CP) and these programs. Section 4 describes the intuition that lead us to the formulation (CP).
PROOF OF THEOREM 1.1
Let us first verify that (CP) is actually a convex program. The feasible region is defined by linear constraints; thus, we only have to check that the objective is convex. The terms corresponding to the y ij s are linear. The term i∈A p i log p i β i is the relative entropy of p and β and is well known to be convex in the nonnegative variables p i and β i . 1 Let us now verify the feasibility claim. PROOF. Assume that ( ) is violated, that is, there is a strongly connected component consisting of a single node i 0 , and there is no loop in E incident to i 0 (that is, u i 0 i 0 = 0). For a contradiction, assume that (CP) admits a feasible solution (y, p, β). Then, y gives a feasible circulation on the graph (A, E) such that there is a positive amount of flow entering (and leaving) every node. The circulation y can be decomposed to a weighted sum of directed cycles: y = t k=1 w k χ C k , where for each 1 ≤ k ≤ t, χ C k is the 0-1 incidence vector of a directed cycle C k , and w k ≥ 0. Clearly, every cycle C k must be contained inside a strongly connected component. Thus, no cycle may be incident to i 0 , that is, the flow entering this node is 0, a contradiction.
Assume now that ( ) is satisfied. Consequently, there is a directed cycle C i in (V, A) incident to every node i. Set y = i∈A χ C i , and let p i denote the amount of y entering the node i. This gives a feasible solution to (CP) with β i = min j∈A p j u ij . CLAIM 2.2. The objective value in (CP) is nonnegative, and it is 0 if and only if the prices p i and the allocations x ij = y ij / p j form a market equilibrium. Conversely, for every market equilibrium p i , x ij , we get an optimal solution to (CP) by setting p i = αp i ,
1 Let us give a simple proof. We need to verify that, for every q, b, q , b ≥ 0 and 0 < λ < 1, we have that
This can be derived using the convexity of x log x for q/b, q /b with the linear combination λ * = λb
This implies that the objective value is ≥ 0. Moreover, the lower bound is tight if and only if u ij β i = p j whenever y ij > 0. This is equivalent to all transactions being best bang-per-buck purchases. It is easy to verify that the solution represents a market equilibrium. The second part also follows easily.
The proof of the assertion in Theorem 1.1 that optimal solutions to (CP) correspond to market equilibria is complete by the following lemma. LEMMA 2.3. Whenever (CP) is feasible, the optimum value is 0.
Let us now formulate the KKT conditions on optimality. Since all constraints in (CP) are linear, these are necessary and sufficient for optimality. Consider an optimal solution ( p, y, β), and let us associate Lagrange multipliers δ j , γ i , w ij , and τ i to the inequalities in the order as described in (CP). We obtain the following conditions.
Also, Equation (1) must be tight for all y ij > 0, and Equation (3) must be tight for all β i > 0. Further, τ i > 0 implies that p i = 1, and w ij > 0 implies that u ij β i = p j . Note that, in an optimal solution, every β i > 0; thus, Equation (3) always holds with equality. We can therefore derive the following from Equation (3):
The following remark can be interpreted as a "self-duality" property: a market equilibrium does not only provide a primal optimal solution to (CP) but also optimal Lagrange multipliers.
Remark 2.4. Assume that there exists a market equilibrium ( p, x) ; by rescaling, we may assume that p i ≥ 1 for all i ∈ A. As in Claim 2.2, p, y ij = p j x ij and β i = min i∈A p j /u ij give an optimal solution to (CP). It is straightforward to check that γ j = log β j , δ j = log p j , w ij = x ij , and τ = 0 give optimal Lagrange multipliers.
The next claim expresses the optimum objective value of (CP) in terms of the Lagrange multipliers. CLAIM 2.5. Let (y, p, β) be a primal optimal solution, and let (γ, δ, w, τ ) be optimal Lagrange multipliers. Then, (1) is tight whenever y ij > 0. Taking the combination of these equalities multiplied by y ij , we get that In the second equality, we used the flow conservation constraints in (CP). Next, let us add the equalities (2) multiplied by p i . We obtain that
PROOF. By complementary slackness, Equation
Here, we used Equation (4) for the second term, and that p i = 1 whenever τ i > 0 for the third term. Adding this to the previous inequality proves the claim.
Using the previous claim, Lemma 2.3 follows from the next lemma.
LEMMA 2.6. For the optimal Lagrange multipliers (γ, δ, w, τ ), it follows that
PROOF. The proof is by induction on the number of agents |A|. We assume that for all markets with < |A| agents, the assertion holds. Let us introduce q i := e δ i and θ i := e γ i . These are quantities playing a similar role to p i and β i : the conditions (1) can be rewritten as
furthermore, by complementary slackness, it follows that if y ij > 0, then equality must hold. The θ i s are therefore the inverse best bang-per-buck values for the prices q. Let F ⊆ E denote the set of arcs with u ij β i = p j and H ⊆ E the set of arcs with u ij θ i = q j . By complementary slackness, supp(y) ⊆ H and supp(w) ⊆ F. Let us define
CLAIM 2.7. We have that p i β i ≤ q i θ i for every i ∈ S. Further, if i j ∈ F, i ∈ S and p i β i = q i θ i , then j ∈ S holds.
PROOF. The first claim is equivalent to
For the second part, assume for a contradiction that q j < αp j for some best bang-perbuck arc ij ∈ F with i ∈ S. This would imply that the inequality above is strict, giving a contradiction.
Together with Equation (2), this gives
with equality only if
denote the sets of agents having all their best bang-per-buck goods in S with respect to prices p. Recall that supp(w) ⊆ F. By the definition of T , we get from Equation (4) that j∈S w ij p j = p i ∀i ∈ T .
Combining this with the straightforward j∈S y ij ≤ p i , for all i ∈ T , we obtain that i∈T j∈S
Rearranging the sums gives
The next step requires the following observation.
CLAIM 2.8. For every arc i j ∈ H with j ∈ S, it follows that i ∈ T .
PROOF. For a contradiction, assume that i / ∈ T , that is, there exists a good j / ∈ S with ij ∈ F. Then,
Recall that supp(y) ⊆ H; therefore, if j ∈ S and y ij > 0, then i ∈ T must hold by Claim 2.8. Thus, if j ∈ S, then i∈T y ij = p j . Combining this with Equations (5) and (7), we get that
We must have equality throughout; therefore, for all j ∈ S, it follows that τ j = 0 and p j β j = q j θ j ; the latter was a necessary condition for equality in Equation (5). Now, the second part of Claim 2.7 guarantees that S ⊆ T .
Using Equation (6), we have that i∈T j∈S w ij p j = i∈T p i . On the other hand, these qualities guarantee that i∈T j∈S w ij p j = i∈S p i . We can therefore conclude S = T . Moreover, the following holds. CLAIM 2.9. No arc in supp(y) ∪ supp(w) enters or leaves the set S.
PROOF. Recall that supp(y) ⊆ H and supp(w) ⊆ F. Since S = T , the definition of T implies that no arc ij ∈ F leaves S; recall that supp(w) ⊆ F. The second inequality in Equation (8) must hold with equality, implying that w ij = 0, whenever i ∈ A\ S, j ∈ S. Claim 2.8 implies that no arc ij ∈ H enters S, and supp(y) ⊆ H. The first to equalities in (CP) imply that i∈S, j∈A\S y ij = i∈A\S, j∈S y ij . Thus, no arc with y ij > 0 may leave S.
If A = S, then the proof of Lemma 2.6 is complete. If S A, then consider the restrictions of ( p, y, β) and (γ, δ, w, τ ) to A \ S, and to the arcs inside A \ S. The first gives a feasible solution to (CP) on the restricted graph, whereas the second gives optimal Lagrange multipliers, since the primal-dual slackness conditions are satisfied. According to our assumption on S being a minimal counterexample, it follows that τ i = 0 for all i ∈ A \ S, completing the proof.
To complete the proof of Theorem 1.1, it is left to verify the claim on the existence of a rational optimal solution. This will follow from the next structural observation; note that the feasible region is a polyhedron. CLAIM 2.10. There exists an optimal solution to (CP) that is an extremal point of the feasible region.
PROOF. Consider an optimal solution z = ( p, y, β) to (CP); by the above, we know that it corresponds to a market equilibrium. As every point in the feasible region, z can be written as the sum of extremal rays and a convex combination of extremal points. Pick an arbitrary extremal point z * = ( p * , y * , β * ) from the combination. We claim that this is also an optimal solution to (CP). By Claim 2.2, it suffices to show that it corresponds to a market equilibrium, which is equivalent to u ij β * i = p * j whenever y * ij > 0. For a contradiction, assume that u ij β * i < p * j and y * ij > 0 holds for an ij ∈ E. Since z * is included in the convex combination giving z, every strict inequality for z * must also be strict for z; this would contradict the optimality of z.
Since every extremal point of a rational polyhedron is rational with polynomially bounded size, the proof of Theorem 1.1 is complete. Next, we derive the bound on the values of equilibrium prices and allocation. For this, we assume that all u ij s are integers, since scaling them by a constant does not change the equilibrium.
LEMMA 2.11. Assume that all utilities are integers ≤ U and we let := 2 n−1 (n + 3) n+ 1 2 U n . Then, there exists equilibrium prices p that are quotients of two integers ≤ , along with allocations x that are quotients of two integers ≤ 2 .
PROOF. From Claim 2.10, an optimal solution to (CP) is achieved at an extremal point, say z * , of the associated polyhedron. Let m denote the number of nonzero y ij s at z * . We claim that m ≤ 2n−1. Consider the bipartite graph (A, A, E ) , where E = {(i, j) | y ij > 0}, |E | = m. If this graph contains a cycle, then the y ij s can be modified such that every binding constraint remains binding and we get one more pair (i, j) with y ij = 0, in a contradiction with v being a vertex.
Let Cz = b denote a subset of binding constraints for z * in the linear system defining the feasible region of (CP), after removing the columns corresponding to the y ij = 0 variables. The number of columns is m + 2n ≤ 4n − 1. Note that the 2n equalities corresponding to the nodes are linearly dependent; therefore, the rank of the matrix C is at most m + 2n − 1.
By Cramer's rule, every y ij , p j , and β i is the quotient of two integers bounded by the maximum subdeterminant of (C, b). Using Hadamard's bound, this is at most the product of the largest (m+2n−1) column norms of (C, b) . Note that ||b|| ≤ √ n < √ n + 3, as the only constraints containing nonzero constants are the p i ≥ 1 inequalities. The norm of each of the m columns corresponding to the y ij variables is √ 2, as each y ij is contained in two constraints with coefficient 1. Similarly, the norm of each of the n columns corresponding to the p i s is at most √ n + 3, and the norm of each of the n columns corresponding to the β i s is at most √ nU . We need the largest m + 2n − 1 columns, and therefore may remove one of those of norm 2. From this, we can conclude that every p j and y ij is the quotient of two integers bounded by . Since the allocation x ij = y ij / p j , we get that every x ij is the quotient of two integers bounded by 2 .
Remark 2.12. The above bound can be further strengthened to = n!U n .
RELATION TO PREVIOUS WORK

Existence Results
The Arrow-Debreu market is traditionally formulated in a more general setting. In addition to the set of agents A, there is a set of goods G, and each agent arrives to the market with an initial endowment w ig ≥ 0 of good g. A market is given as M = (A, G, u, w) . Our setting corresponds to the special case in which G = A, and w ij = 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise. We shall refer to our special case as bijective markets.
Again, a market equilibrium consists of prices p : G → R >0 and allocations of goods x ijg : A × A × G → R + , where x ijg represents the amount of good g sold by agent j to agent i such that:
-i∈A x ijg = w jg , ∀ j ∈ A, g ∈ G, that is, every good of every agent is fully sold. -For every i ∈ A, whenever x ijg > 0 for some g ∈ G and j ∈ A, then u ig / p g is the maximal value over g ∈ G.
-j∈A,g∈G x ijg p g = g∈G w ig p g , ∀i ∈ A, that is, the money spent by agent i equals agent i's income.
The general case can be easily reduced to bijective markets (see, e.g., Jain [2007] ). First, if a good is included in the initial endowment of multiple agents, we give a different name for each such occurrence. If an agent has k goods in the endowment, we split the agent into k copies with the same utility function, each owning one of the goods.
Consider now a market in the general form M = (A, G, u, w). We say that a subset S of agents is self-sufficient whenever u ig > 0, for some i ∈ S implies that w i g = 0, ∀i ∈ A \ S. That is, agents in S are not interested in the goods owned by agents not in S. We say that a market is irreducible if there exists no self-sufficient proper subset of the agents. The following sufficient condition was given by Gale in 1957 . THEOREM 3.1 ([GALE 1957 ). If the market M = (A, G, u, w) is irreducible, then there exists an equilibrium. This condition is sufficient, but not necessary. Later, Gale [1976] presented a strengthening of this theorem. We say that a subset S of agents is super self-sufficient if, in addition to what has been stated earlier, ∃i ∈ S such that w ig > 0 and u i g = 0, ∀i ∈ S. That is, an agent in S owns a good for which no agent in S is interested. We show that, in our special case of bijective markets (i.e., G = A, and w ij = 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise), the existence condition in Theorem 1.1 is equivalent to that in Theorem 3.2.
LEMMA 3.3. A bijective market is irreducible if and only if the directed graph (A, E) is strongly connected. Further, ( ) holds if and only if no subset of A is super self-sufficient.
PROOF. The first part follows since, in a bijective market, a subset S ⊆ A of agents is self-sufficient if and only if no arc enters S in the directed graph (A, E). For the second part, assume first that ( ) is violated for node k, and let T denote the set of nodes different from k that can be reached on a directed path in E from k. Now, let S = T ∪ {k}. It is easy to check that S is super self-sufficient, since w kk > 0 and u ik = 0, ∀i ∈ S.
Conversely, assume that there exists a super self-sufficient set S. According to the condition, there exist k ∈ S, such that w kk > 0 and u ik = 0, ∀i ∈ S. Clearly, k is a singleton component with no self-loop in the strongly connected components of graph (A, E), verifying ( ).
Previous Convex Programs
Let us first present Cornet's convex program [1989] . It was originally given for the general case of arbitrary endowments, but we present it here for bijective markets. Also, it was originally formulated with a max-min objective over the feasible region and τ i = 0 for all i ∈ A. Using these, we can substitute x = w, q = δ. This yields a feasible solution to (CP-C).
INTUITION LEADING TO THE FORMULATION
In this section, we explain the intuition that led us to the formulation (CP). The motivation was the standard reduction of optimization LP to feasibility LP. Consider the primal and dual pair of linear programs in the standard form:
From weak duality, c T x ≤ b T y for any feasible primal and dual solutions. Let us put all constraints together and add b T y ≤ c T x:
Optimal pairs of primal and dual solutions to the previous pair of programs are in one-to-one correspondence with the feasible solutions to this program.
Let us now consider two convex programs for the linear Fisher market: one of Shmyrev [2009] and Birnbaum et al. [2011] , and the other, the dual of the Eisenberg-Gale convex program (see Devanur [2009] ). In Fisher's model, there is a set of buyers A and another set of goods G. Buyer i arrives to the market with a budget m i , and has linear utility u ij ≥ 0 on good j; let E ⊆ A× G denote the set of pairs with u ij > 0. As we study bijective markets, we assume that A = G, and good i is initially owned by buyer i. One can verify that the maximum is always at most the minimum. Let us now put the constraints of the two programs together, set the objective as minimizing the dual minus the primal objective, and formally substitute the constant m i with the variable p i . This leads to the convex program (CP).
